Pairing games and markets

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here

Non-invasive assessment of short and ultra-short heart rate variability during different physical and physiological tests

The main aim of the present study was to determine the short- and ultra-short-term heart rate variability (HRV) during different physical and physiological tests and to compare HRV to different performance levels. The latter aim was to compare participants’ short- and ultra-short-term heart rate variability before-duringpost- tests. Our hypothesis was that there would be a significant difference between test performance and HRV parameters, and the high performing group would have significantly higher HRV parameters than the low performing group. Fifty-three healthy men (Mage=26.9±4 years, Mheight=177.9±5.7 cm; Mweight=77.8±8.7 kg) were recruited in the current study. We completed the data collection procedure for each participant in four consecutive days. On day-1, anthropometric measurements were conducted and then participants performed isokinetic tests. On day-2, participants performed anaerobic tests; on day-3 equilibrium tests, and on day-4 aerobic capacity tests. The HRV records of all participants were obtained before, during and after all these tests. Based on the participants’ performance, they were divided into two groups: participants in G1 had lower performance and those in G2 higher performance. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA yielded significant differences in HRV values obtained in the four different tests. There was a significant difference between fitness test performance and the variation of short- and ultra-short-term HRV parameters. Also, significant differences in HRV values before, during, and after the testing were observed

Aggregate efficiency in random assignment problems

We introduce aggregate efficiency (AE) for random assignments (RA) by requiring higher expected numbers of agents be assigned to their more preferred choices. It is shown that the realizations of any aggregate efficient random assignment (AERA) must be an AE permutation matrix. While AE implies ordinally efficiency, the reverse does not hold. And there is no mechanism treating equals equally while satisfying weak strategyproofness and AE. But, a new mechanism, the reservation-1 (R1), is identified and shown to provide an improvement on grounds of AE over the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). We prove that R1 is weakly strategyproof, ordinally efficient, and weak envy--free. Moreover, the characterization of R1 displays that it is the probabilistic serial mechanism updated by a principle decreed by the Turkish parliament concerning the random assignment of new doctors: Modifying the axioms of Hasimoto, et. al. (2012) characterizing the probabilistic serial mechanism to satisfy this principle, fully characterizes R1

Aggregate effects of social security reform in 2008

In this study, we investigate the effects of social security reform in 2008 on aggregate variables. We focus only on to the change in retirement age of this reform by leaving the other structural and administrative changes aside. Our main results are as follows: (i) social security reform has a great positive effect on capital accumulation; (ii) aggregate labor supply in efficiency units increases while mean labor hours remain relatively costant; (ii) social security tax rate to balance the budget of social security system decreases dramatically

Assortative Mating and Inequality

This paper studies the evolution of assortative mating based on the permanent income (the individual-specific component of income) in the U.S., its role in the increase in family income inequality, and the factors behind this evolution. I first document a remarkable trend in the assortative mating, as measured by the permanent-income correlation of couples, across families formed around 1970 and those formed around 1990. I show that this trend accounts for almost one-third of the increase in family income inequality across these family cohorts. I then argue that the increased marriage age across these cohorts contributed to the assortative mating and thus to the rising inequality. Individuals face a large degree of uncertainty about their permanent incomes early in their careers. If they marry early, as most individuals around 1970 did, this uncertainty leads to weak marital sorting along permanent income levels. But when marriage is delayed, as around 1990, the sorting becomes stronger as individuals are more able to predict their likely future incomes. After providing reduced-form evidence on the impact of marriage age, I build and estimate a marriage model with income uncertainty, and show that the increase in marriage age can explain almost 75 percent of the increase in the assortative mating

Pairing Games and Markets

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here

Applied Probability Trust (29 December 2006) RUIN PROBABILITY WITH CERTAIN STATIONARY STABLE CLAIMS GENERATED BY CONSERVATIVE FLOWS

We study the ruin probability where the claim sizes are modeled by a stationary ergodic symmetric α-stable process. We exploit the flow representation of such processes, and we consider the processes generated by conservative flows. We focus on two classes of conservative α-stable processes (one discrete-time, and one continuous-time), and give results for the order of magnitude of the ruin probability as the initial capital goes to infinity. We also prove a solidarity property for null-recurrent Markov chains as an auxiliary result, which might be of independent interest